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This paper uses matched employer-employee data from the Longitudinal 
Employer Household Dynamics database to investigate the contribution of worker and 
firm reallocation to within industry changes in wage inequality between 1992 and 2003. 
We find that the entry and exit of firms and the sorting of workers and firms based on 
underlying worker "skills" are important determinants of changes in industry earnings 
distributions over time. Our results suggest that the underlying dynamics of earnings 




Disentangling the sources of changes in earnings inequality has long been a 
challenge. The literature has provided both demand and supply side explanations, 
including, for example, skill-biased technological change, minimum wage adjustments, 
changes in workforce composition, and declines in unionization. Yet, although wages are 
determined by the interaction of both firms and workers, most analytical work has been 
based on the examination of cross-sectional surveys of workers. This means that little is 
known about the impact on the earnings distribution of changes in the types of firms and 
the allocation of workers across those firms.   
In this paper we use matched administrative data that has longitudinal information 
on both workers and the firms for which they work to begin to fill this gap in knowledge. 
Our focus complements earlier worker-based studies that examine changes in within 
group inequality by examining within industry inequality. 
The analysis in this paper uses the new data to advance knowledge about the 
sources of changes in earnings inequality in several ways. First, it quantifies the impact of 
changes in workforce composition, particularly workforce skill and experience, on the 
earnings distribution by examining the reallocation of workers into and out of the 
workforce. Second, it tracks the reallocation of workers across jobs to examine the 
earnings impact of changing firm wage premia, due to changes in unionization, 
compensating differentials, or rent-sharing. Finally, it examines the impact of firm entry 
and exit, and the resulting job allocation, on the earnings distribution, providing 
commensurate insight into the impact of changing production processes. Because our    
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interest is primarily on understanding the impact of changes in firms and the allocation of 
workers across firms, and rather than on changing industry structure, we examine each 
industry separately.  In addition, the relatively short period of time for which the data are 
available does not permit us to address the issue of changes in the price of skill.  
The paper is structured as follows. After a brief review of the literature and 
discussion of the data, we present some basic empirical facts about the changes in 
earnings distributions in each industry sector. We then develop an econometric method 
for decomposing the sources of change in the earnings distributions when employer-
employee matched data are available. The remaining sections of the paper describe the 
results of performing these decompositions and summarize the implications. 
In general, we find that there is no one single “silver bullet” explaining changes in 
the earnings distribution in each industry. Even when the direction of change is similar 
across industries, the underlying contributing factors can be very different. Most 
interestingly, even in industries in which overall inequality is trending in opposite 
directions, the influence of one set of factors can be consistently in the same direction.    
Not surprisingly, given the extensive amounts of worker and firm reallocation that 
have been documented in the literature, we find that both types of reallocation have large 
effects on different parts of the earnings distribution. In particular, the entry and exit of 
firms and sorting of workers and firms based on underlying worker “skills” are important 
determinants of changes in industry earnings distributions over time. By and large, new 
firms act to improve the lot of workers at the bottom of the income distribution, but at the 
same time, existing low-wage firms have expanded their share of employment of low-
wage workers. The former result is consistent with the notion that new firms are more 
productive than old, while the latter is consistent with the fears of policy-makers that 
there are fewer “high-wage” jobs available to low-wage workers. Although our analysis 
focuses on the consequences of within-industry reallocation, these results suggest caution 
when searching for simple answers to questions raised by complex economic phenomena. 
2. Background  
a) Earnings Inequality    
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Despite a vast literature that attempts to disentangle the sources of increased 
inequality that has occurred in recent decades, there is still not complete consensus.
1 A 
large number of researchers agree that the change was driven by skill biased technical 
change interacting in complex ways with changes in unionization, management structure, 
and international trade (see, e.g., Acemoglou 2002). However, some researchers point to 
changes in the composition of the workforce as an important contributor to earnings 
inequality changes (Lemieux, 2004). Others point to structural changes. Card and 
DiNardo (2002) argue that changes in the minimum wages and declines in unionization 
were the dominant contributors to recent observed trends in inequality. Fortin and 
Lemieux (1997) also examine the impact of de-regulation in the 1980s, focusing on the 
transportation, communication, and banking industries.  
Recently, Autor, Katz and Kearney (2005) have found that since the late 1980’s 
there has been a divergence in the change in wage inequality between the upper and 
lower halves of the wage distribution with the lower half, as measured by the 50-10 
difference in log wages, either being compressed or not changing and the upper half, as 
measured by the 90-50 difference, exhibiting a steady rise in inequality. They find that 
labor force compositional shifts have increased wage inequality with the impact being an 
offset to countervailing wage compression movements in the lower half of the 
distribution and a reinforcing effect on residual wage inequality increases in the upper 
half of the distribution. 
Although almost all of the literature is driven by analyses of worker-based 
surveys, most notably the Current Population Survey (CPS), there is some firm-based 
evidence that suggests that changes in the distribution of wages may be due in part to 
changes on the firm side of the labor market. Bernard and Jensen (1998) find that 
increases in wage inequality across states are highly correlated with shifts in industrial 
composition, particularly the decline in manufacturing. Burgess, Lane and McKinney 
(2001) observe sizeable differences in the trends in earnings inequality across industries 
in Maryland. Other studies have also established the role of firm effects on wages and on 
wage inequality. Davis and Haltiwanger (1991) find that firm size is an important 
determinant of wages, and that wage inequality has shifted both among and within 
                                                 
1 For a relatively recent survey of the wage inequality literature see Katz and Autor (1999).    
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manufacturing plants. Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) examine the relationship 
between “high wage firms,” or firms that seem to pay a wage premium or markup, and 
“high wage workers,” who earn a more than we would expect given their observable 
characteristics, most likely as a return to unobserved skill.  
b) Worker and Firm Reallocation 
The re-allocation approach in this paper is different from that taken in the 
previous literature, which has attempted to directly disentangle the relative contribution 
of different factors on changes in wage inequality using time series of cross-sectional 
datasets.  By employing longitudinal matched employee-employer data in this study we 
can focus on the impact of types of workers, types of firms, and the match between the 
two, on changes in the earnings distribution over time. The results can then be compared 
with the direct evidence for consistency (or inconsistency). In particular, changes in 
workforce composition that lead to an increasingly skilled workforce would be consistent 
with demand side explanations such as skill biased technological change.  Similarly, firm 
entry and exit that lead to high premium firms replacing low premium firms can be linked 
to firm learning and selection of new technologies (Jovanovic (1982), Ericson and Pakes 
(1995), Haltiwanger, Lane and Spletzer, 2006).
2 Changing sectoral earnings inequality in 
low-wage and highly unionized industries would be consistent with hypotheses about the 
impact of changing unionization and real minimum wages.  
A priori, it is certainly clear that there is sufficient turbulence in each of these 
factors – workforce composition, the types of firms, and the reallocation of workers -- to 
effect change in the earnings distribution.  The potential to change even the most stable 
workforce at the firm level over a decade or more is quite substantial. Burgess, Lane and 
Stevens (2000) point out that some 42% of workers are still employed by the same 
employer in non-manufacturing; 32% in manufacturing after 9 years.    In addition, there 
is ample room for changing firm and industry structure to alter the economic landscape. 
Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) document the large magnitude of job creation and 
destruction.  They also note the dominance of idiosyncratic factors in accounting for the 
observed fast pace of job reallocation, while later work (Foster et al, 2005) suggests that 
                                                 
2 It is worth noting that Aghion (2001) has argued that this is an important determinant of earnings 
inequality.    
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more productive firms replace less productive ones. Firm entry and exit play a role as 
well. Spletzer (2000) reports that forty percent of new businesses die within three years 
of their birth, and more than half of all jobs destroyed in a three-year period are due to the 
death of establishments.  
 
3. The LEHD Data  
The approach is made possible by the existence of a new database created by the 
Longitudinal Employer and Household Dynamics (LEHD) Program at the U.S. Census 
Bureau
3. These data enable us to match workers with past and present employers, 
together with employer and worker characteristics (Abowd, Haltiwanger and Lane, 
2004). This database consists of quarterly records of the employment and earnings of 
almost all individuals from the unemployment insurance systems of a number of US 
states in the 1990s
4.  These type of data have been extensively described elsewhere 
(Haltiwanger, Lane and Spletzer, 2006), but it is worth noting that there are several 
advantages over household based survey data. The data are current, and the dataset is 
extremely large. Since the scope of the data is almost the universe of employers and 
workers in the covered private sector
5, it is possible to trace the movements of workers 
across earnings categories and across employers. The Unemployment Insurance records 
have also been matched to internal administrative records containing information on date 
of birth, place of birth, race, and sex for all workers, thus providing limited demographic 
information.   
Of particular importance given the focus of this study is the reasonably accurate 
reporting of both earnings and industry.  A recent paper by Hirsch and Schumacher 
(2004) points out that as many of 30% of respondents to the Current Population Survey – 
the major source of information on earnings inequality in the literature - do not respond 
to income questions, and are consequently imputed. In the LEHD data, the earnings are 
quite accurately reported, since there are financial penalties for misreporting. In addition, 
                                                 
3 Much more detail is provided in the appendix. 
4 Because of the sensitivity of these data it is worth noting that the data are anonymized before they are 
used in any Census Bureau projects.  Any research that is engaged in must be for statistical purposes only, 
and under Title 13 of the U.S. code, any breach of confidentiality can result in prosecution in which 
violators are subject to  a $250,000 fine and/or 5 years in jail.  
 
5 Stevens (2002) describes coverage issues related to the LEHD database.    
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there is substantial internal evidence from the LEHD program that workers not only often 
misreport earnings, but also do not accurately identify their industry at the major industry 
level (Decressin et al, 2006).   
Because almost all jobs held by all workers in the covered private sector 
workforce are included the LEHD dataset, it is possible to analyze two different facets of 
the labor market – both jobs and employment.  The two obviously differ to the extent that 
there is multiple job holding, and to the degree in which there is churning of workers 
through different sets of jobs.  When we use workers as the unit of analysis, we will 
typically describe their employment with their main (or dominant) employer over the 
year, and characterize that employer’s industry, size, and turnover rates.  Earnings refer 
to quarterly earnings, and we have no information on either wage rates or hours and 
weeks worked.  
Another feature of the LEHD data is new measures of human capital.  While 
standard measures of human capital include such variables as education and experience, 
other measures, such as ability or family background, have rarely been able to be 
captured.  However, work by Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993), for example, 
demonstrates that a major contribution to increased earnings inequality in the 1980s was 
an increase in return to “unmeasured” characteristics—for example, interpersonal skills.  
The LEHD dataset permits the quantification of the value of these measures, although not 
permitting a decomposition of the source (Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis, 1999; Abowd, 
Lengermann, and McKinney, 2003).  This is achieved by capturing the portable 
component of individual earnings
6—that component that belongs to an individual as she 
or he moves from job to job in the labor market and that is separate from the type of firm 
for which she or he works. We use two measures of human capital: the part associated 
with the person effect—the unobservable individual heterogeneity—and the time varying 
experience measure. In interpreting the human capital measure, several remarks should 
be made. First, the human capital measure is not simply a ranking of the wage of the 
worker, precisely because wages include both person and firm effects. Second, the person 
effect will reflect the influence of any time-invariant personal characteristics. Thus, it will 
reflect factors such as the education level of the individual and other observable 
                                                 
6 The log real annualized full-time, full-year wage rate described in Abowd et al, 2003.    
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accumulated skill correlates and it will reflect unobserved dimensions of skill. At the 
same time, it is a measure of human capital that abstracts from firm effects that may be 
present in measures based upon observable characteristics – but will not reflect either 
firm-specific human capital or, in a related manner, match effects.     
We also analyze the role of the firm effect.  The firm effect literally captures the 
extent to which the firm the worker is attached pays above or below average wages (after 
controlling for person effects) and may reflect many factors including rent sharing, firm 
specific human capital, compensating differentials or unionization effects (Abowd, 
Lengermann, and McKinney, 2003, Andersson, Holzer and Lane, 2005).  
In order to analyze the widest possible time interval (1992 – 2003) we limit our 
data to four states: California, Illinois, Maryland and North Carolina.  In 2003 these states 
accounted for approximately 21% of U.S. employment.
7 
 
4. Basic Empirical Facts by Sector 
a) Changes in inequality 
  We use the 1992-2003 difference in log (real) wages at different percentiles to 
illustrate the changes in the earnings distributions across industry sectors.
8 Table 1 shows 
the 90
th, 50
th (median) and 10
th percentile of earnings in 2003 and the 90-10, 90-50, and 
50-10 log wage differences by sector.  
An examination of the first three columns of this table demonstrates that there are 
substantial earnings differences across industries. For example, median earnings are over 
twice as high in mining as in the agriculture/fishing/forestry sector, and similar 
differences hold at both the 90
th and 10
th percentiles. Earnings at the high and low end of 
the distribution also vary greatly across sectors. The highest 90
th percentile earnings are 
found in the finance/insurance sector ($114,000), while the lowest 10
th percentile 
earnings are in retail and agriculture/fishing/forestry (both under $10,000). The 
distribution of earnings also varies across sectors, particularly the 90-10 and 90-50 log 
wage differences. The 2003 90-10 log wage gap is highest in services, finance/insurance, 
                                                 
7 The fraction was computed using data from the Current Population Survey’s Monthly Outgoing Rotation 
Groups for 2003.  
8 We use the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) to identify industry sectors. The public sector is 
omitted.     
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wholesale, retail, and manufacturing. These same five industries also had the highest 90-
50 log wage differences in 2003. In contrast, inequality at the lower end of the earnings 
distribution does not vary as much across industries, though services had the largest 50-
10 log wage difference.  
Figure 1 depicts empirical estimates of the cumulative distribution functions of 
annualized earnings for all sectors and, as expected, shows a rightward shift from 1992 to 
2003. When we repeat the same exercise on an industry by industry basis, we find that 
although the direction of change is the same for each industry, the most marked rightward 
shifts were in agriculture/fishing/forestry and the finance/insurance sectors. Other sectors, 
including manufacturing, transportation/communication, and wholesale, had only modest 
shifts but with a tendency toward increasing inequality, with a (larger) shift right at the 
top of the distribution. The most remarkable result, however, is the lack of volatility in 
the earnings distributions shown in these figures, which is especially notable given the 
enormous amount of economic change that firms have faced over this time period. 
The overall rightward shift was not by the same amount at all points of the 
earnings distribution in each industry, as evidenced in Table 1. In fact, earnings 
inequality as measured by the 90-10 log wage difference declined in four industries: 
agriculture, mining, construction, and retail trade.  By contrast, earnings inequality 
increased in five industries: manufacturing, transportation/communication, wholesale, 
finance/insurance, and services.  
In order to compare changes in wage inequality in the upper and lower tails of the 
earnings distribution, Figures 2-4 plot the 90-10, 90-50, and 50-10 wage gaps by 
industry, showing clearly the variability in trends across sectors. In three of the four 
industries in which overall inequality (the 90-10 log wage difference) declined, much or 
all of the decrease was in the lower half of the earnings distribution (as measured by the 
50-10 log wage gap). Only in mining was there much of a decline in the upper half (the 
90-50 log difference). In contrast, lower-tail earnings inequality did not increase in the 
five industries in which overall inequality increased. The increase in earnings inequality 
in manufacturing, transportation/communication, wholesale, finance/insurance, and 
services occurred in the upper tail of the earnings distribution. The distance between the 
90
th and 50
th percentiles increased in these six industries, while the 50-10 log difference    
  10
stayed about the same or decreased slightly. These results confirm the findings of Autor 
et al. (2005), who find using CPS data that economy-wide, the 90-50 wage gap grew 
through the 1990s while the 50-10 difference leveled off after about 1987. Yet we also 
see differences in trends in upper and lower tail inequality across the sectors.  
To compare the changes observed in our four-state LEHD data with the U.S. labor 
market as a whole we computed estimates of the log real weekly earnings percentiles for 
1992 and 2003 for all U.S. workers using data from the 1992 and 2003 Current 
Population Survey’s Monthly Outgoing Rotation Groups (CPS-MORG). These estimates 
are provided in Table 2, Panel A. Panel B of Table 2 presents similar statistics from the 
CPS-MORG when the samples are limited to the same four states used in our LEHD 
analyses. 
As can be seen from the tables the estimated change in the 90-10 difference 
between 1992 and 2003 was somewhat higher for the full-sample CPS-MORG data (.09) 
as compared to the LEHD (.06).  The estimated change in the 90-50 difference for the 
LEHD was actually higher than the CPS-MORG (.09 for LEHD versus .06 for CPS-
MORG). The estimated change in the 50-10 difference, however, was substantially lower 
for the LEHD data (-.03 for LEHD versus .03 for CPS-MORG). As is shown in Panel B 
of Table 2 much of the differences can be accounted for by the fact that the LEHD 
contains only four states. 
b) Changes in types of workers 
  One possible reason for these changes in the earnings distribution is that 
workforce characteristics have changed over time.  That there is certainly ample potential 
for such changes to occur is evident from an examination of Table 3.  In manufacturing, 
for example, of the more than 5 million workers who were employed in either 1992, 2003 
or both years, more than 40% were only in the industry in 1992, 35% were only in the 
industry in 2003, and only 21% were there in both years.  As one might expect, the 
change in the workforce is even more marked in the retail food industry: 39% were only 
in the industry in 1992; almost half were only in the industry in 2003, and fewer than 
12% were in the industry in both years. 
The evidence presented in Table 4 shows that this mobility did not translate into 
enormous swings in the age, gender and skill distribution of workers, although there were    
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some dramatic changes in the allocation of workers across sectors.  In particular, the 
mining and manufacturing sectors shrank as services expanded, and they remained 
predominantly male and skewed toward older workers.  By contrast, industries such as 
finance, insurance, and real estate as well as services continued to have more females and 
younger workers. Similarly, although the skill level of the workforce increased in all 
industries (using both the overall measure of human capital, which includes experience, 
and the individual fixed effect), the swings are not substantial.   
c) Changes in types of firms 
  Another possible reason for changes in earnings inequality is changes in the types 
of firms that are hiring workers. We examine this possibility in Table 5, which can be 
read in the same way as Table 3. In manufacturing, for example, of the more than 
100,000 firms who employed individuals in either 1992, 2003 or both years, about 36% 
were only in the industry in 1992, 37% were only in the industry in 2003, and only 27% 
were there in both years.  The rates are even lower in industries with more small firms: in 
retail trade, 40% were only in the industry in 1992; 41% were only in the industry in 
2003, and about 20% were in the industry in both years. While industry differences exist, 
as both panels of Figure 5 show, all industries had high rates of firm entry and exit over 
the 1992-2003 period. 
 
d) Changes in the joint distribution of human-capital/ pay policy pairings    
  One source of change in earnings inequality is changes in the joint distribution of 
employee human capital and firm pay levels. Suppose we estimate a linear panel data 
model with fixed firm and individual effects such as that described in Abowd, Kramarz, 
and Margolis (1999),      
(,) it i j i t it y θ ψε =+ + + it x β   
where  it y  are individual i's earnings at time t, xit is a vector of observed productivity 
measures of individual i at time t,  i θ  is an individual fixed effect that measures an 
individual’s unobserved productivity or human capital and  (,) jit ψ  the fixed effect of the 
firm that individual i works for at time t and measures a firm’s pay policy.  Then changes 
in the distribution of earnings may be due to changes in the joint distribution of  θ  andψ .     
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For example, over time it may be the case that high θ  individuals are more likely to work 
at high ψ  firms and low θ  individuals are more likely to work at lowψ firms, which 
would tend to increase earnings inequality. Using the estimated values of θ  and ψ  this 
model, Figure 6 plots the joint distributions of  θ  and ψ  for 1992 and 2003.
9  As can be 
seen from these graphs between 1992 and 2003 the likelihood of a low θ  individual 
being at a high ψ firm has declined. Thus individuals with low skill levels are less likely 
in 2003 than 2002 to be paired with firms with high pay policies. Figure 7 displays the 
expected values of θ  by decile groups of ψ  for 1992 and 2003. This figure clearly shows 
that there has been a large upward shift between 1992 and 2003 in the expected value of 
θ  for the highestψ  decile group of firms.  Whether this finding is a result of entry and 
exit of different types of firms and workers or is due to a reshuffling of worker-firm 
matches, however, cannot be determined these figures.       
  
  Although these descriptive statistics hint at the potential for worker and job 
reallocation to affect earnings inequality, they report average effects for all firms and 
workers in the industry. To further investigate the trends in inequality, in the next section 
we develop an econometric approach to examine different points of the earnings 
distribution. 
 
5. Decomposing Earnings Distribution Changes with Employer-Employee Matched 
Data 
In this section, we develop econometric methods for decomposing changes in 
earnings distributions when employer-employee matched panel data are available. For the 
sake of describing the earnings decomposition method, we shall initially assume that we 
have only one continuous exogenous predictor variable x. Moreover, since we are 
examining earnings data as opposed to wage data, we do not attempt to examine the 
impact of changes in the real value of the minimum wage over time (see DiNardo, Fortin 
and Lemieux, 1996; and Lee, 1999).  
                                                 
9 The estimates included age variables as controls.    
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Let θ  be a variable representing an individual’s (unobserved) productivity that is 
assumed to be constant over time. Further, let ψ  represent a firm’s (unobserved) pay 
policy variable that is also assumed to be constant over time. An individual’s earnings is 
assumed to be determined by the function  (,, ,) y gx ε θψ =  where ε  is a random error 
component which is assumed to be independent of x,θ , and ψ . 
For expositional simplicity, we assume that the variables x,θ , ψ , and ε have a 
continuous joint probability density function ft for each time period t=1,2.  
(1) d ( , , , ) ( , , , )dt tt Px f x ε θψ εθψ = .            
One additional facet of the data is the fact that between the two time periods, within an 
industry firms can be created or destroyed and workers may enter or exit. Thus, for both 
firms and workers there are stayers (s), leavers (l) and new entrants (n) Now, we can 
rewrite the joint distribution in (1) at time period 1 as a mixture of these worker-firm 
types: 
(2) 
11 1 1 1
11 11
( , , , ) (w= , f= ) ( , , , ) (w= , f= ) ( , , , )
(w= , f= ) ( , , , ) (w= , f= ) ( , , , )
ss ls
sl ll
f xp ss f xp ls f x





.      
     
where p1(w=s,f=s) is the fraction of worker-firm matches where both firm and worker 
remain in  the industry until time 2, p1(w=l,f=s) is the fraction of worker-firm matches 
where the firm remains in the industry until time  2 but the worker leaves, p1(w=s,f=l) is 
the fraction of worker-firm matches where the worker remains in the industry until time 2 
but the firm leaves, and p1(w=l,f=l) is the fraction of worker-firm matches where both the 
worker  and firm leave by time 2. The distributions,  1 (,, ,)
ss f x εθψ , 1 (,, ,)
ls f x εθψ , 
1 (,, ,)
sl f x εθψ , and  1 (,, ,)
ll f x εθψ  are the analogous conditional distributions. On the 
other hand, the joint distribution in (1) at time period 2 as can be written as   
(3) 
22 2 2 2
22 22
(,,,) ( w = ,  f = ) (,,,) ( w =,  f = ) (,,,)
(w= , f= ) ( , , , ) (w= , f= ) ( , , , )
ss ns
sn nn
f xp ss f xp ns f x





.       
 
where n indicates new entrants into the industry between time 1 and time 2. 
The order of the sequential decomposition may differ. In this paper, we first analyze the 
extent to which worker entry and exit has changed the earnings distribution by    
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considering the counterfactual of what if there had been no exit and entry of workers. In 
that situation, (3) becomes 
(4) 
2
22 1 1 22 (w= , f= ) ( , , , ) (w= , f= ) ( , , , ) (w= , f= ) ( , , , )
(,, ,)
ss ls sn








21 2 (w= , f= ) (w= , f= )+ (w= , f= ). R p ssp ls p sn =+  
Here, we have assumed that, had those individuals who left actually stayed, they would 
have matched with firms in a manner analogous to the distribution of workers who 
actually left those firms that stayed in the industry.  
Next, we consider the impact of the change in the distribution of x. Here, we note that, 
for example,  
22 2 (,, ,) (,, |) ()
ss ss f xf x f x εθψ εθψ ≡  





() (,, ,) (,, |) () (,, ,) ()








, 22 1 1 22 (w= , f= ) ( , , , ) (w= , f= ) ( , , , ) (w= , f= ) ( , , , )
(,, ,)
ss x ls x sn x






=   
Next, we look at the impact of firm entry and exit by looking at the counterfactual that 
assumes that the set of firms (as well as workers and x) at time 2 is the same as time 1: 
(7) 
2
,, , , ,
12 1 1 1 1 (,,,) ( w = ,  f = ) (,,,) ( w = ,  f = ) (,,,) ( w = ,  f = ) (,,,)
wxe s sx l sx l lx f xp ss f xp ls f xp ll f x εθψ εθψ εθψ εθψ =+ +  
 
Finally, after we have restricted the set of firms and workers to be the same as in period 
1, it is still possible to exam how the distribution of θ  given ψ  may have changed 







(,, ,) (,, , |, ) (, )





ε θψ εθψ θψ θψ
εθψ θψ θψ ψ
≡
=
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so we can define  
(9) 
,,, ,, ,,
22 1 1 (,, ,) (,, , |, ) ( | ) ( )
wxea wxe wxe fx f x f f ε θψ εθψ θψ θψ ψ ≡      
  
where the superscript refers to holding the allocation of workers to firms constant.     
From these counterfactual distributions, we can decompose changes in the earnings 




() ( , , , ) tt
xg x A
Py A f x ddd d x
εθψ εθψ
ε θψ ε θ ψ
∈
∈= ∫ .          
  
 
We can then define the counterfactual probabilities by 
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Suppose, in general, that we wish to decompose the expected value of some function r of 
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where D denotes the domain of ( , , ,x ε θψ ).  Note that in (15) we have  ( ) ( ) ry Iy A =∈  
where I is the indicator function.
10 
                                                 
10 This decomposition technique can be extended to the case where the earnings 
function (,, ,) yg x ε θψ =  varies across time (i.e.  (,, ,) t y gx ε θψ = ) by incorporating an additional 
decomposition step that would measure the impact of this “structural” change on the distribution of 
earnings. 
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We apply this general decomposition technique to the LEHD data described 
above so that we can explore the determinants of wage and earnings distribution changes 
over time for different industries. To put more structure on the relationship between y and 
(,,, x ε θψ ) we assume that the relationship takes the form of a linear panel data model 
with fixed firm and individual effects such as described in Abowd, Kramarz, and 
Margolis (1999). So, the function g has the following form 
(16)  (,) (,, ,) it i j i t it yg ε θψ θ ψ ε == + + + it xx β   .         
Thus, we assume that no structural change has occurred over this time period and (16) 
was used to estimate the determinants of log earnings using the entire LEHD data. 
Since our focus is on examining changes in earnings distributions over time 
within industries, from this estimation we calculate  ( , , , ) t dP ε θψ x  for each industry. In 
the LEHD data all exogenous variables (e.g., age, gender) are discrete. Thus, the 
discussion presented above that analyzed decompositions with a continuous explanatory 
variable, does not directly apply. With discrete explanatory variables, however, we 
simply estimate the distribution of  ( , , ε θψ) for each distinct category of exogenous 
variable within each industry-time cell.  
To perform this decomposition, we will be required to estimate the continuous 
distribution of ( , , ε θψ) for several categories of x within each of the ten industries. Since 
the number of observations in the LEHD data is extremely large, we accomplished this 
task by discretizing these variables. We discretized each variable by breaking the range 
into 100 mutually exclusive intervals and assigning the midpoint value to each 
observation that falls within the interval. This method is applied for all intervals except 
the lowest and highest intervals (which are unbounded). For the highest (lowest) interval 
we assign a value that equals the average of the lower (higher) boundary value and the 
highest (lowest) observed value in the (industry) sample. We denote the discretized vales 
by  ( , ,
dd d ε θψ).  Earnings are then recomputed using the discretized values by:  
(17)  (,)
dd d d
it i j i t it y θ ψε =+ + + it x β .             
The decompositions are then performed on 
d
it y  using the discrete analogs of the equations 
presented above. 
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6. Decomposition Results 
First we decomposed the changes in the earnings distributions into the  amount 
due to worker entry and exit, changes in observable characteristics, firm entry and exit 
and changes in the distribution of worker unobserved attributes (θ ) for a given firm pay 
policy (ψ ) – i.e., sorting
11. The results of these decompositions are presented in Table 
6.
12   
A graphical display of the decomposition of the entire log earnings distribution is 
presented in Figures 8 and 9. The decomposition is portrayed in the figures in terms of 
the differences in the cumulative density functions (c.d.f’s). Figure 8 presents the 
difference in the c.d.f.’s for all sectors between 1992 and 2003, while Figure 9 presents 
the decomposition of this change into the various factors. Tables 6 and 7 provide the 
results of the decomposition. 
The results presented in the first three rows of Table 6 decompose the sources of 




percentiles, while the last three describe the effect on changes in inequality.  Thus, the 
first column indicates that log earnings for a worker in the 10
th percentile stood at 9.379 
in 2003; in the 50
th percentile at 10.341; and in the 90
th percentile at 11.322.  As a result, 
the 90
th percentile worker made roughly 194% more than the 10
th percentile worker, and 
98% more than the median worker, while the median worker made about 96% more than 
the 10
th percentile worker.  A comparison of this with the 1992 distribution, presented in 
the second to last and last columns, shows that inequality as measured by the 90/10 ratio 
was about 6.4 log points greater in 2003 than in 1992: the 90
th percentile worker made  
188% as much as the 10
th percentile worker. This increase came about entirely from an 
increase in the 90-50 difference: the gain in earnings of the 90
th percentile worker relative 
to the median worker was almost 10 log points; the 50-10 difference actually decreased.  
These gross changes, however, mask considerable flux in the earnings distribution 
due to changes in the underlying factors, which are spelled out in the intervening 
columns.  An examination of the second column reveals that changes in the sector 
                                                 
11 One additional step needed when investigating the decomposition of earnings changes for all sectors is 
the change in the employment distribution of sectors over time. This step is performed first. 
12 While the order of the decomposition may affect the results, switching the order of worker entry and exit  
and firm entry and exit in the decompositions led to similar findings.  For the sake of brevity these results 
are not reported.    
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distribution of employment led to small increases in both the 90-50 and 50-10 log 
earnings differences. Worker entry and exit had no impact on the 50-10 log earnings 
difference and resulted in a slight decrease in the 90-50 log earnings difference. More 
important were changes in observed worker characteristics, which led to decreases in 
both the 50-10 and 90-50 log earnings differences. While entry and exit of firms led to 
large decreases in the 50-10 and 90-50 log earnings differences, these effects were almost 
entirely offset by the impact of sorting of workers and firms.  
The results presented in Table 7 present exactly the same set of sequential 
decompositions of the cumulative distribution functions: the first panel presents the 
results for industries in which inequality declined, the second for industries in which 
inequality increased. 
  The first striking result upon examining the decompositions is the degree to which 
each separate factor affects the earnings distribution, even in industries where – in net 
terms – there are not substantial changes in earnings. In the services sector, for example, 
the 90-10 log wage gap rose only slightly from 1.92 in 1992 to 1.97 in 2003 (Table 7). 
Earnings rose similarly at both ends of the distribution: log earnings in the 10
th percentile 
rose from 9.24 in 1992 to 9.35 in 2003, while log earnings in the 90
th percentile in 1992 
was 11.16 but had risen to 11.33 by 2003. Yet our analysis reveals remarkable 
differences in the way in which changes in the composition of workers, firms and the 
match between the two affects earnings in different parts of the distribution – often in 
offsetting ways.   
Looking first at the four industries in which overall inequality (as measured by the 
90-10 log wage difference) declined, Table 7 shows the change in three inequality 
measures due to each of the factors. The second column reveals that, despite the high 
levels of worker churning, the churning was among workers of the same average skill 
level (θ ), resulting in basically no change in inequality. That this is true in every industry 
suggests that, by and large, workforce quality within each industry is quite persistent, 
which is consistent with work by Haltiwanger, Lane, and Spletzer (2006). An analysis of 
the third column reveals that, holding θ  constant, the aging of the workforce (and the 
associated returns to experience) acted to decrease earnings inequality in three of the four 
industries, with little impact in the retail sector. Increased experience led to increased    
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earnings at both ends of the distribution, but with a larger impact at the 10
th percentile 
than at the 90
th (except in retail), thus decreasing inequality.  
The entry and exit of firms clearly has an enormous impact on the earnings 
distribution, as is evident from a comparison of column three with column four in Table 
7. In mining, column four (compared to column three) shows that if no firm entry or exit 
had occurred between 1992 and 2003, the 90-10 log wage gap would have swung by over 
120 log points, most of which occurred between the 50
th and 10
th percentiles. Notably, 
firm entry and exit typically acted to increase earnings at the bottom end of the 
distribution more than at the top, and in some cases, decreased earnings at the top end, 
resulting in a decline in the 90/10 ratio in each industry.  
Finally, the effect of the match between workers and firms is evident in a 
comparison between the fourth and fifth columns. Sorting of workers across different sets 
of firms actually had a larger negative impact on earnings for workers in the 10
th 
percentile than in the 90
th percentile in the four industries with declining inequality. 
Sorting acted to raise 90
th percentile earnings in three of the four industries. The net 
result, however, was an increase in earnings inequality in each of the industries. 
The second panel in Table 7 reports the decompositions for the five industries in 
which overall earnings inequality increased (as measured by the 90-l0 log wage gap). As 
was the case for the declining-inequality industries, worker churning had little effect on 
the earnings distribution in these sectors. Comparing the second and third column shows 
that increased experience lowered inequality by raising earnings more at the bottom than 
the top of the earnings distribution in each of the industries. Interestingly, however, the 
impact of changing experience on earnings, while largely symmetric across the 
distribution within industries, is quite different across industries. For example, changes in 
experience affected the 10
th and 50
th earnings percentiles in manufacturing by 20 log 
points, compared with closer to 10 log points in services.   
The effect of firm entry and exit was substantial in these five industries, and in 
general led to a decrease in earnings inequality. In most of the five industries, entry and 
exit of firms raised earnings at the bottom more than at the top end of the distribution. In 
wholesale, the 90
th percentile of earnings dropped considerably due to firm entry and exit. 
Finally, comparing the fourth and fifth columns indicates that sorting of workers among    
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firms generally led to an increase in inequality. Earnings at the bottom of the distribution 
were much lower due to sorting, leading to a rise in all three inequality measures in all 
industries. This effect was quite large in manufacturing and services. 
Overall, the decompositions in Table 7 show that, while trends in overall 
inequality as measured by the 90-10 log wage difference diverged across industries, 
similar factors were at work. Worker entry and exit had little effect on the wage 
inequality measures, despite high levels of worker churning in the economy. Increased 
experience (as measured by the aging of workers) acted to increase earnings at all levels, 
but with a larger impact at the lower end of the distribution. Thus, increased experience 
tended to lessen wage inequality in all industries. Firm entry and exit and sorting of 
workers were the biggest factors, with the former acting to decrease inequality offset by 
the latter effect increasing it in most of the industries. Yet despite the similarities in 
underlying factors, the size of these effects differed considerably across the industries.  
The Kullback-Leibler measure of the distance provides a more aggregate 
summary statistic for comparing these trends.
13 Table 8 presents the decomposition of the 
Kullback-Leibler measure between the 1992 and 2003 earnings distributions. There is 
some evidence that worker entry and exit tended to widen the distance between the 1992 
and 2003 earnings distributions in mining, manufacturing, and 
transportation/communication, while shrinking the distance in all other industries. 
Changes in observable characteristics tended to widen the distance between the two 
distributions for all but those three industries as well. Firm entry and exit narrowed the 
distance between the 1992 and 2003 earnings distributions across all industries. In 
contrast, sorting of workers among firms widened the distance across all industries. 
  To summarize, earnings distributions changed differently across all industries 
over the 1992 to 2003 period. However, while worker entry and exit into an industry 
appeared to have little effect on the industry earnings distributions over that time period, 
firm entry and exit tended to compress the dispersion of within-industry earnings 
distributions, while resorting among firms and workers tended to widen the dispersion of 
within-industry earnings distributions. Changes in the observable characteristics of 
                                                 
13 The Kullback – Leibler measure for two density functions f1 and f2  is defined by 
[] 12 1 2 0 () () l n (() / () ) f wf w f w f w d w
∞
− ∫ .    
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workers, which in our data are primarily the aging of workers within an industry, lead to 
an increase in all the percentiles we examined, to varying extents, in all industries. 
  When focusing on the observed decrease in the 50-10 percentile difference, 
overall and across many industries, it appears that some of this decrease is due to changes 
in observable characteristics while the remaining appears to be due to the fact that entry 
and exit of firms and changes in employee – employer matches have big but opposite 
impacts, the negative impact of entry and exit of firms tends to dominate the positive 
impact of the change in employer-employee matches. The one factor that appears to have 
played a role in the increase in the 90-50 percentile difference observed both overall in 
for many industries is the positive impact of changes in employee – employer matches. 
Both changes in observable characteristics and firm entry and exit tended to lower this 
difference. 
Before concluding it is important to note that the decomposition of changes in the 
earnings distribution, while accounting for worker entry and exit into an industry, did not 
account for the source of worker entry and the destination of those who exit. Workers can 
enter a particular industry either by leaving another industry or by entering the sample 
over the period. Similarly workers can exit an industry by moving to another industry or 
leaving the sample.
14 Some data on the observed and unobserved measures of human 
capital for these industry entrants (leavers) as well as the pay policies of the firms the join 
(leave) are presented in Table 9.  
Among workers entering industries between 1992 and 2003 approximately 81% 
were individuals not in the sample in 1992. Industry entrants who are new entrants into 
the sample between 1992 and 2003 have both lower observed and unobserved skill levels 
and work at firms who pay less than workers who remained in the industry between 1992 
and 2003. While workers who were observed to switch industries between 1992 and 2003 
also had lower unobserved skills and worked at firms that tended to pay less than those 
who didn’t switch, the magnitude of the difference was considerably smaller than for 
                                                 
14 Workers entering the sample can be new labor force entrants who resided in our group of states or 
migrants from other states. Workers leaving the sample can be workers leaving the labor force or workers 
moving to a state outside our group of states. Unfortunately, we can not distinguish these different groups 
of sample entrants and leavers.    
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those who were new entrants into the sample. Moreover, the observed skills of industry 
switchers were similar to non-switchers.  
Among workers exiting industries between 1992 and 2003 roughly three-quarters 
had also left the sample. While sample leavers had lower unobserved skills than those 
who switched industries, their observed skill level was slightly higher. Moreover, they 
tended to leave firms that had pay policies similar to those from which industry switchers 
left.  
One of the interesting findings is the very large and offsetting effects of entry/exit 
of firms and the change in worker-firm sorting. An examination of the tables reveals that 
the largest manifestation of this phenomenon occurs in the 10th percentile of the 
distribution. This result raises the possibility that the sorting adjustment is due to the 
substantial increase of the minimum wage in California in 2002 to $6.75, while the other 
states remained at $5.15. In other words, old California firms would still have been at a 
lower minimum wage in the counterfactual, not in reality, while new entering firms 
would have entered with a higher minimum. We examine this possibility in Table 10.  
In the service industry, which has large numbers of minimum wage workers, if 
California is included, the counterfactual had there been no entry and exit of firms is that 
the log wage in services would drop by .993.  Without California, the same 
counterfactual is that the log wage would drop by only .129.  In contrast, the 50th 
percentile drop of .186 with California included has a much smaller change to a .013 drop 
with California excluded; similarly, the 90
th percentile drop is .002 with California 
included and the change is only .004 with California excluded.   
Of course, other factors may also be at play.  The other industry with substantial 
numbers of minimum wage workers is the retail trade industry, and an examination of 
Table 10 reveals little evidence of the same pattern in that industry. However, an analysis 
of the Current Population Survey data shows a substantial drop in the proportion of part-
time workers in the industry: from 33% in 1992 to 22% in 2003.   The observed 
phenomenon might be due to exiting firms disportionately hiring part-time workers, 
while firms entering hire disproportionately many full-time workers. This explanation 
would thus focus more on hours than wages, and rely on the fact that part-time workers 




In this paper, we used a new linked employer-employee dataset from the 
Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics Program to explore changes in the earnings 
distributions across sectors of the economy. We hoped to advance knowledge on the way 
in which the reallocation of jobs and workers affect changes in earnings inequality by 
focusing on within industry changes in earnings inequality.  We directly examined the 
way in which changes in workforce composition, firm entry and exit and job reallocation 
affect industry-specific earnings distributions. Finally, we directly examined the degree to 
which changes in the matching of workers and firms affect earnings inequality.  
While there were differences across industries in the magnitudes and directions of 
change in various aspects of the earnings distribution over the 1992 to 2003 time period, 
our earnings decompositions revealed that most factors had similar qualitative effects 
across all industries. In particular, even in industries in which there was very little change 
on the aggregate earnings distribution between 1998 and 2003, there were enormous, 
albeit offsetting, changes in the factors contributing to earnings change. Similar factors 
were at work in industries with declining inequality as well as those with increasing 
inequality. The magnitudes of these effects, however, varied considerably.  
In particular, we found that worker entry and exit had very little impact on 
changes in the earnings distributions over this time period for the industries examined. In 
other words, despite the ample opportunities for firms to change their workforce 
composition, industry workforces remained, by and large, very similar, and earnings 
gains due to experience tended to be higher at the lower end of the distribution. This does 
not lend credence to the notion that individual firms are changing their production 
technologies in a way that is biased towards skill. 
Changes in observable characteristics, which mainly involved the aging of the 
workforce within each industry, tended to shift the earnings distributions of all industries 
to the right.  The effect of an increasingly experienced workforce on earnings inequality 
is to decrease it in three of the four declining inequality and in all of the five increasing 
inequality industries – in each case primarily by increasing earnings at the bottom of the 
earnings distribution.    
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On the other hand, the net impact of firm entry and exit is to reduce the dispersion 
of earnings for all industries. In almost all industries this effect acted to increase earnings 
at the bottom end of the distribution more than at the top.  Since firm wage premia are 
likely to primarily reflect rent sharing, unionization and/or efficiency wage payments, it 
is difficult to reconcile the fact that these premia are disproportionately being paid to 
workers at the bottom end of the earnings distribution with a declining importance of 
wage setting institutions for low wage workers.  In addition, we do not find the changing 
sectoral earnings inequality in low-wage and highly unionized industries that would be 
consistent with hypotheses about the impact of changing unionization and real minimum 
wages.   
Finally, sorting of workers based on the “human capital” measures over time 
tended to increase the dispersion of industry earnings distributions between 1992 and 
2003. This is consistent with the idea that the driving force of economic change is the 
entry and exit of firms, and can be linked to the selection of new technologies, and the 
associated workforce, by new firms. 
Our findings suggest that even when earnings distributions seem superficially not 
to change, or to shift in opposite directions, the extensive amounts of worker and firm 
reallocation that have been documented in the literature do have large effects on different 
parts of the earnings distribution. In particular, the entry and exit of firms and sorting of 
workers and firms based on underlying worker “skills” are important determinants of 
changes in industry earnings distributions over time.  
Our paper demonstrates the utility of matched employer – employee panel data in 
decomposing changes in earnings distributions over time. Our results suggest that the 
underlying dynamics of earnings inequality are complex, and are due to factors that 
cannot be measured in standard cross-sectional data. 
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Appendix A 
This appendix provides some additional detail on measures of mobility and earnings that 
were constructed using the LEHD data.  
 
Measuring Labor Force Participation 
The datasets provide summary statistics (pooled across 4 states) of the earnings and 
human capital distributions for each sector and each year. For each measure of earnings 
or human capital, the files provide summary statistics of the distributions of several sets 




A worker’s dominant employer is the SEIN (state employer identification number – this 
is the state UI administrative unit) that contributes the most to the worker’s earnings in 
each year. Thus, each worker employed during a year has one (and only one) dominant 
employer per year. 
 
Full Time Workers 
We use data from Current Population Survey in combination with LEHD state data to 
impute whether or not a worker is employed full time in each year at his “main” job 
(analogous to “dominant employer” concept used in LEHD state data). We use CPS 
variables to perform this imputation using a logit model, and the dependent variable was 
taken from the CPS question of whether or not the respondent was employed full time at 
the main employer last year. 
 
Three characteristics of the findings suggest that this imputation was quite successful. 
First, the standard errors on the coefficients were very small. Second, for individuals 
found in both the CPS and the LEHD state data, the imputation results were very similar 
to the observed outcomes. Third, for all individuals, the predicted probabilities of 
working full time were clustered into two groups such that predicted probabilities for all 
members of one group were extremely high and the predicted outcomes for the second 
group were extremely low. More discussion of this imputation can be found in Abowd, 
Lengermann and McKinney (2003) (hereafter ALM). 
 
Work at End of Quarter One 
The distribution of workers employed in a sector at a particular point in time may differ 
substantially from the distribution of all workers working in the sector at any time during 
the year. To obtain a “snapshot” of the earnings and human capital distribution in each 
sector, it is necessary to identify those workers most likely working at a certain point in 
time. Because we have only quarterly employment information for each worker, we are 
constrained to approximate the point-in- time employment for each sector. The point of 
time we have chosen is the end of quarter one of each year. This timing is consistent with 
the timing of the employment count reported by businesses in the Economic Census and 
other business surveys. To identify those workers who are most likely working at the 
same employer at the end of quarter one, we use an indicator of employment at an SEIN 
in quarter one and in quarter two. The reasoning here is that workers employed at the    
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same SEIN for these two continuous quarters are, with high probability, continuously 




The LEHD data permit the construction of several different earnings measures. We 
choose to focus on primarily on log real annualized earnings.  
Because we do not observe hours worked in the data but instead only observe quarters 
worked, we have constructed the “annualized” earnings measure which is, for each 
worker, the full-time full year earnings equivalent. This variable is adjusted for 
discontinuities in labor market attachment during the year and is used as the dependent 
variable in the decomposition of the individual’s “wage” into person effect, firm effect, 
and an experience component. First, we define full quarter employment in quarter t as 
having an employment history with positive earnings for quarters t - 1 , t , and t +1. 
Continuous employment during quarter t means having an employment history with 
positive earnings for either t-1 and t or t and t+1. Employment spells that are neither full 
quarter nor continuous are designated discontinuous. If the individual was full quarter 
employed for at least one quarter at the dominant employer, the annualized wage is 
computed as 4 times average full quarter earnings at that employer (total full quarter 
earnings divided by the number of full quarters worked). This accounts for 84% of the 
person-year-state observations in our eventual analysis sample. Otherwise, if the 
individual was continuously employed for at least one quarter at the dominant employer, 
the annualized wage is average earnings in all continuous quarters of employment at the 
dominant employer multiplied by 8 (i.e., 4 quarters divided by expected employment 
duration during the continuous quarters of 0.5). This accounts for 11% of all 
observations. For the remaining 5%, annualized wages are average earnings in each 
quarter multiplied by 12 (i.e., 4 quarters divided by an expected employment duration 
during discontinuous quarters of 0.33). For additional details, please see ALM. 
 
 
Measuring Human Capital: 
The details of the human capital measures are contained in ALM. In the reported 
statistics, there are three measures reported: overall human capital (h), the person effect 
(θ) and the experience effect. Note the overall human capital measure is the sum of the 
person effect, the experience effect and a reference constant (see in particular equation 
(25) in ALM). Note that by construction the grand mean of the person effect is zero so 
some workers (groups) have negative person effects. All components are from a log 




When computing the worker and firm fixed effects, only dominant job spells held by 
workers who are between 18 and 70 years old and who are imputed to work full time at 
that job are used to compute human capital measures. Thus, only workers who have been 
imputed to work full time in at least one job will have a valid person effect. However,    
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once calculated, these measures may be applied to any job spell (dominant or other, full 
time or other) held by the worker. 
 
Defining the Sample of Workers 
The data include year and sector specific earnings and human capital statistics for 
workers who we have identified as having a dominant employer that year (where the 
dominant employer is defined as the employer contributing the most to the workers 
annual earnings), who are imputed to work full time that year, who we have identified as 
likely working at the end of the first quarter that year, and who have earnings (real) of at 
least $250 in at least one quarter of the year. 
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Table 1: Earnings Levels, Differences and Changes by Sector, 1992-2003 
Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics 
   2003 Earnings Percentiles 
90-10 Log Wage 
Difference 
90-50 Log Wage 
Difference 
50-10 Log Wage 
Difference 
 Sector  90th  50th  10th  2003 
Change from 
1992  2003 
Change from 
1992  2003 
Change from 
1992 
AgricFishForestry  $44,149  $19,234  $9,126  1.58  -0.14  0.83  -0.02  0.75  -0.12 
Mining  $82,705  $45,879  $22,427  1.30  -0.09  0.59  -0.06  0.72  -0.03 
Construction  $73,174  $34,181  $14,831  1.60  -0.12  0.76  -0.01  0.83  -0.11 
Manufacturing  $90,650  $34,176  $15,183  1.79  0.13  0.98  0.16  0.81  -0.02 
TransCommunication  $82,987  $39,597  $15,959  1.65  0.13  0.74  0.12  0.91  0.01 
Wholesale  $96,084  $34,852  $15,307  1.84  0.11  1.01  0.12  0.82  0.00 
Retail  $51,404  $19,820  $8,512  1.80  -0.05  0.95  0.01  0.85  -0.06 
Finance/Insurance  $114,428  $37,083  $16,244  1.95  0.18  1.13  0.15  0.83  0.03 
Services  $83,079  $31,346  $11,523  1.98  0.05  0.97  0.08  1.00  -0.03 
All Sectors  $82,207  $31,477  $11,992  1.93  0.06  0.96  0.10  0.97  -0.03 
Notes: Based on data from CA, IL, MD and NC.    
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Table 2A: Weekly Earning Percentile Differences and Changes by Sector, 1992-2003 
Current Population Surveys Monthly Outgoing Rotation Groups: All States 
  
90-10 Log Wage 
Difference 
90-50 Log Wage 
Difference  50-10 Log Wage Difference
SIC Sector  2003 
Change 
from 1992 2003 
Change 
from 1992 2003  Change from 1992
AgricFishForestry  1.46  0.00  0.79  0.07  0.67  -0.06 
Mining  1.34  -0.12  0.66  -0.10  0.68  -0.02 
Construction  1.42  0.04  0.73  0.06  0.69  -0.02 
Manufacturing  1.51  0.04  0.84  0.07  0.67  0.14 
TransCommunication  1.57  0.19  0.72  0.13  0.85  0.06 
Wholesale  1.59  0.07  0.82  0.01  0.77  0.06 
Retail  1.88  0.04  0.91  -0.01  0.97  0.04 
Finance/Insurance  1.75  0.14  0.96  0.12  0.78  0.02 
Services  1.97  0.05  0.92  0.04  1.05  0.00 
All Sectors  1.86  0.09  0.89  0.06  0.97  0.03 
Notes: Data weighted using CPS earnings weights. 
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Table 2B: Log Real Weekly Earning Percentiles Differences and Changes by Sector, 1992-2003 
Current Population Surveys Monthly Outgoing Rotation Groups: CA IL MD NC 
  
90-10 Log Wage 
Difference 
90-50 Log Wage 
Difference  50-10 Log Wage Difference 
SIC Sector  2003 
Change 
from 1992 2003 
Change 
from 1992 2003  Change from 1992 
AgricFishForestry  1.46  0.22  0.97  0.24  0.49  -0.02 
Mining  1.38  0.04  0.96  0.31  0.43  -0.27 
Construction  1.46  -0.02  0.75  0.10  0.71  -0.11 
Manufacturing  1.69  0.13  0.97  0.17  0.72  -0.05 
TransCommunication  1.63  0.36  0.74  0.20  0.89  0.16 
Wholesale  1.63  0.13  0.87  0.13  0.76  0.01 
Retail  1.89  0.03  0.96  0.02  0.93  0.01 
Finance/Insurance  1.78  0.08  0.95  0.12  0.83  -0.04 
Services  2.01  0.04  0.95  0.03  1.06  0.01 
All Sectors  1.87  0.05  0.92  0.04  0.95  0.01 
Notes: Data weighted using CPS earnings weights. 
    
  34
 
Table 3: Worker Mobility In and Out of Industrial Sectors 
Proportion in Industry Sector 
Sector 
Number of 
Workers in 1992 & 
2003 
in 1992 and not 
2003 
in 2003 and 
not 1992 
in 1992 and 
2003 
AgricFishForestry  578,036  39.13%  47.97%  12.89% 
Mining  67,888  56.47%  29.20%  14.33% 
Construction  1,511,595  32.21%  53.40%  14.38% 
Manufacturing  5,145,894  43.89%  34.75%  21.35% 
TransCommunication  1,775,581  36.58%  44.18%  19.24% 
Wholesale Trade  2,006,918  41.03%  46.86%  12.10% 
Retail Trade  4,214,151  39.03%  49.25%  11.71% 
FIRE   2,101,998  35.97%  47.10%  16.93% 
Services  10,196,180  31.00%  50.97%  18.02% 
Source: LEHD data for CA, IL, MD and NC. 
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Table 4: Changes in Workforce Composition Between 1992 and 2003 
Change in 
Proportion of 
workforce that is 
Human 
Capital  Individual Fixed Effects 
Sector 
Employment 






points)  (log points) 
AgricFishForestry  300,709 17%  -7%  -6% 1% 5% 0.17  0.05 
Mining  48,063 -39%  2%  0% -11%10% 0.11  0.08 
Construction  704,268 46%  -1%  -5% 1% 4% 0.1  0.03 
Manufacturing  3,357,441 -14%  2%  -7% -1% 7% 0.17  0.06 
TransCommunication  991,212 14%  2%  -3% -4% 7% 0.09  0.06 
Wholesale Trade  1,066,376 11%  0%  -7% 0% 7% 0.13  0.06 
Retail Trade  2,138,239 20%  0%  -5% 1% 4% 0.12  0.04 
FIRE   1,111,889 21%  3%  -5% -1% 6% 0.14  0.05 
Services  4,998,570 41%  0%  -4% -4% 7% 0.08  0.06 
Source: LEHD data for CA, IL, MD and NC. 
    
  36
 
Table 5: Firm Entry and Exit Rates 














AgricFishForestry  50,825 32%  -0.28  39%  -0.23  29%  -0.23 
Mining  2,135 45%  0.38  35%  0.28  20%  0.35 
Construction  155,195 33%  0.02  45%  0.05  22%  0.1 
Manufacturing  107,200 36%  0.2  37%  0.15  27%  0.18 
TransCommunication  56,355 35%  0.18  45%  0.16  20%  0.21 
Wholesale Trade  143,414 36%  0.11  43%  0.12  21%  0.11 
Retail Trade  263,093 40%  -0.23  41%  -0.24  20%  -0.22 
FIRE   120,763 33%  0.13  46%  0.2  22%  0.13 
Services  686,606 31%  0.05  49%  0.04  19%  0.01 
Source: LEHD data for CA, IL, MD and NC. 
* Means are employment weighted. 
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Table 6: Decompositions of Changes in Log Real Earnings Distributions Between 1992 and 2003: All Sectors 





(3) + Change in 
observable worker 
characteristics 
(4) + Firm entry 
and exit 
(5) +Sorting of 
firms and workers  1992 
Change from 
1992 to 2003 
Measure  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
10
th percentile  9.379  9.393  9.403  9.245  8.261  9.082  9.276  0.103
50
th percentile  10.341  10.347  10.357  10.209  10.059  10.188  10.271  0.070
90
th percentile  11.322  11.322  11.337  11.254  11.299  11.242  11.155  0.167
90-10 difference  1.943  1.929  1.934  2.009  3.038  2.160  1.879  0.064
90-50 difference  0.981  0.975  0.980  1.045  1.240  1.054  0.884  0.097
50-10 difference  0.962  0.954  0.954  0.964  1.798  1.106  0.995  -0.033
Source: LEHD data for CA, IL, MD and NC. 
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Table 7: Decomposition of Changes in Log Earnings Inequality Measures 








Sorting of firms 
and workers  1992 
Change from 
1992 to 2003
Measure  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Panel a: Sectors with Declining Inequality 
Agriculture/Forestry/Fisheries 
10th percentile  9.119  -0.006  0.207  0.264  -0.197  8.837  0.282
50th percentile  9.864  -0.006  0.139  0.038  -0.02  9.703  0.161
90th percentile  10.695  -0.011  0.124  -0.109  0.097  10.556 0.139
90-10 difference  1.576  -0.004  -0.083  -0.373  0.294  1.719  -0.143
90-50 difference  0.831  -0.005  -0.015  -0.147  0.117  0.853  -0.022
50-10 difference  0.746  0  -0.068  -0.226  0.177  0.866  -0.12
Mining 
10th percentile  10.018  0.012  0.224  1.337  -1.374  9.993  0.025
50th percentile  10.734  0.009  0.109  0.293  -0.36  10.741 -0.007
90th percentile  11.323  0.006  -0.026  0.126  -0.029  11.392 -0.069
90-10 difference  1.305  -0.006  -0.25  -1.21  1.345  1.399  -0.094
90-50 difference  0.589  -0.003  -0.135  -0.167  0.332  0.651  -0.062
50-10 difference  0.716  -0.003  -0.115  -1.043  1.014  0.748  -0.032
Construction 
10th percentile  9.605  -0.014  0.158  0.56  -0.362  9.409  0.195
50th percentile  10.439  -0.02  0.12  0.155  -0.079  10.353 0.086
90th percentile  11.201  -0.023  0.065  0.031  0.007  11.125 0.076
90-10 difference  1.596  -0.01  -0.093  -0.53  0.369  1.716  -0.12
90-50 difference  0.761  -0.003  -0.055  -0.124  0.086  0.772  -0.011
50-10 difference  0.835  -0.006  -0.038  -0.405  0.283  0.944  -0.109
Retail 
10th percentile  9.049  -0.006  0.111  0.479  -0.363  8.932  0.117
50th percentile  9.894  -0.01  0.142  0.131  -0.062  9.834  0.06
90th percentile  10.847  -0.011  0.119  -0.017  0.068  10.778 0.069
90-10 difference  1.798  -0.005  0.008  -0.496  0.431  1.846  -0.048
90-50 difference  0.953  -0.001  -0.023  -0.148  0.13  0.944  0.009
50-10 difference  0.845  -0.004  0.031  -0.348  0.301  0.902  -0.057   
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Table 7: Decomposition of Changes in Log Earnings Inequality Measures (continued) 








Sorting of firms 
and workers  1992 
Change from 
1992 to 2003
Measure  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Panel b: Rising Inequality 
Manufacturing 
10th percentile  9.628  0.005  0.199  1.349  -1.294  9.547  0.081
50th percentile  10.439  0.007  0.212  0.13  -0.247  10.381 0.058
90th percentile  11.415  0.002  0.128  -0.076  -0.011  11.199 0.216
90-10 difference  1.787  -0.003  -0.071  -1.425  1.283  1.652  0.135
90-50 difference  0.975  -0.004  -0.084  -0.205  0.236  0.818  0.157
50-10 difference  0.811  0.002  0.013  -1.219  1.047  0.834  -0.023
TransCommunication 
10th percentile  9.678  -0.013  0.172  0.702  -0.69  9.702  -0.024
50th percentile  10.587  -0.012  0.09  0.134  -0.173  10.605 -0.018
90th percentile  11.326  -0.005  0.065  0.011  -0.045  11.22  0.106
90-10 difference  1.649  0.008  -0.107  -0.691  0.645  1.518  0.131
90-50 difference  0.74  0.007  -0.025  -0.122  0.128  0.615  0.125
50-10 difference  0.909  0.001  -0.081  -0.568  0.517  0.903  0.006
Wholesale Trade 
10th percentile  9.636  -0.003  0.172  0.462  -0.379  9.55  0.086
50th percentile  10.459  -0.004  0.148  0.022  -0.09  10.376 0.083
90th percentile  11.473  -0.004  0.077  -0.377  0.292  11.275 0.198
90-10 difference  1.837  -0.001  -0.096  -0.839  0.672  1.725  0.112
90-50 difference  1.014  0  -0.071  -0.399  0.382  0.899  0.115
50-10 difference  0.823  -0.001  -0.025  -0.44  0.289  0.826  -0.003
FIRE 
10th percentile  9.695  -0.006  0.18  0.79  -0.66  9.526  0.169
50th percentile  10.521  -0.007  0.162  0.139  -0.076  10.323 0.198
90th percentile  11.648  -0.006  0.091  -0.098  0.201  11.296 0.352
90-10 difference  1.952  0  -0.088  -0.888  0.861  1.77  0.182
90-50 difference  1.127  0.001  -0.071  -0.237  0.277  0.973  0.154
50-10 difference  0.825  -0.001  -0.018  -0.651  0.584  0.797  0.028
Services 
10th percentile  9.352  0.021  0.134  1.265  -0.993  9.241  0.111
50th percentile  10.353  0.023  0.108  0.186  -0.076  10.269 0.084
90th percentile  11.328  0.012  0.04  0.002  0.106  11.163 0.165
90-10 difference  1.975  -0.009  -0.094  -1.264  1.099  1.922  0.053
90-50 difference  0.975  -0.011  -0.068  -0.184  0.182  0.894  0.081
50-10 difference  1.001  0.001  -0.026  -1.079  0.917  1.028  -0.027
Source: LEHD data for CA, IL, MD and NC. 
Notes: Entries in columns (2) - (5) report the change in the measure when the factor is either assumed not to 
have occurred as in worker and firm entry and exit or replaced by its value in 1992 as in observed worker 
characteristics and the conditional distribution of worker matches (θ) given a firm level of pay (ψ). 
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Table 8: Kullback-Leibler Distance Measure Decompositions 
Change in Statistic when also Accounting for 
Change 1992 to 
2003 
Worker entry and 
exit 
Change in observable 
worker characteristics  Firm entry and exit
Sorting of firms 
and workers 
Sector  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
AgricFishForestry  0.094  0.099  0.013  0.046  0.011 
Mining  0.016  0.016  0.071  0.666  0.066 
Construction  0.032  0.040  0.006  0.095  0.021 
Manufacturing  0.036  0.035  0.070  0.318  0.055 
TransCommunication  0.025  0.025  0.041  0.191  0.034 
Wholesale Trade  0.028  0.029  0.028  0.204  0.058 
Retail Trade  0.019  0.022  0.015  0.134  0.043 
FIRE  0.093  0.098  0.025  0.166  0.031 
Services  0.024  0.031  0.014  0.190  0.057 
Source: LEHD data for CA, IL, MD and NC. 
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Table 9: Sector and Sample Mobility between 1992 and 2003 
Mean 
Mobility Type  Number  Percent θ  xb 1992 xb 2003ψ 1992 ψ 2003 
Switchers: Switch Sectors between 1992 & 2003  2,523,443  9.58% 0.08  1.08  1.37  0.04  0.08 
Entrants: Out of 1992 Sample, In 2003 Sample  10,982,559  41.70% -0.05    .       1.26  .  0.01 
Exiters: In 1992 Sample, Out of 2003 Sample  7,859,437  29.84% 0.02  1.15  .  0.04  . 
Stayers: Remain in Sector between 1992 & 2003  4,974,338  18.89% 0.24  1.16  1.38  0.09  0.09 




Table 9: Sector and Sample Mobility between 1992 and 2003 
Mean 














sectors between 1992 & 
2003  2,523,443  9.58%  0.08  1.08  1.37  0.04  0.08 
Exiters: Out of 1992 
sample and in 2003 
Sample  10,982,559  41.70%  -0.05    .        1.26  .  0.01 
Entrants: In 1992 sample 
and out of 2003 Sample  7,859,437  29.84%  0.02  1.15  .  0.04  . 
Stayers: Remain in 
sector between 1992 & 
2003  4,974,338  18.89%  0.24  1.16  1.38  0.09  0.09 
Source: LEHD data for CA, IL, MD and NC. 
    
  42
 
Table 10: Decomposition of Changes in Log Earnings Inequality Measures 
 Results with California Excluded 
   Change in Statistic when also Accounting for    
2003 
Worker entry and 
exit 




Sorting of firms and 
workers  1992 
Change from 
1992 to 2003
Measure  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Agriculture/Forestry/Fisheries 
10th percentile 
9.195  -0.015 0.174 0.263 -0.180  8.976 0.219
50th percentile 
9.980  -0.018 0.140 0.063 -0.033  9.869 0.111
90th percentile 
10.825  -0.045 0.087 -0.080 0.102  10.715 0.110
90-10 difference 
1.630  -0.030 -0.087 -0.343 0.282  1.739 -0.109
90-50 difference 
0.845  -0.027 -0.053 -0.143 0.135  0.846 -0.001
50-10 difference  0.785  -0.003 -0.034 -0.200 0.147  0.893 -0.108
Mining 
10th percentile 
9.930  0.002 0.265 0.649 -0.474  9.907 0.023
50th percentile 
10.653  0.002 0.187 0.160 -0.296  10.703 -0.050
90th percentile 
11.139  0.002 0.139 -0.002 -0.106  11.159 -0.020
90-10 difference 
1.209  0.000 -0.126 -0.651 0.368  1.252 -0.043
90-50 difference 
0.486  0.000 -0.048 -0.162 0.190  0.456 0.030
50-10 difference 
0.723  0.000 -0.078 -0.489 0.178  0.796 -0.073
Construction 
10th percentile 
9.600  -0.013 0.168 0.552 -0.375  9.434 0.166
50th percentile 
10.422  -0.018 0.155 0.140 -0.087  10.289 0.133
90th percentile 
11.184  -0.021 0.085 0.007 0.023  11.042 0.142
90-10 difference 
1.584  -0.008 -0.083 -0.545 0.398  1.608 -0.024
90-50 difference 
0.762  -0.003 -0.070 -0.133 0.110  0.753 0.009
50-10 difference 
0.822  -0.005 -0.013 -0.412 0.288  0.855 -0.033
Manufacturing 
10th percentile 
9.648  0.003 0.249 1.548 -1.547  9.543 0.105
50th percentile 
10.383  0.003 0.243 0.096 -0.219  10.270 0.113
90th percentile 
11.264  0.003 0.151 -0.247 0.078  11.084 0.180
90-10 difference 
1.616  0.000 -0.098 -1.795 1.625  1.541 0.075
90-50 difference 
0.881  0.000 -0.092 -0.343 0.297  0.814 0.067
50-10 difference 
0.735  0.000 -0.006 -1.452 1.328  0.727 0.008
TransCommunication 
10th percentile 
9.686  -0.003 0.195 0.268 -0.254  9.555 0.131
50th percentile 
10.455  -0.004 0.158 -0.092 -0.044  10.344 0.111
90th percentile 
11.453  -0.004 0.085 -1.040 0.863  11.250 0.203
90-10 difference 
1.767  -0.001 -0.110 -1.308 1.117  1.695 0.072   
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Table 10: Decomposition of Changes in Log Earnings Inequality Measures 
 Results with California Excluded 
   Change in Statistic when also Accounting for    
2003 
Worker entry and 
exit 




Sorting of firms and 
workers  1992 
Change from 
1992 to 2003
Measure  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
90-50 difference 
0.998  0.000 -0.073 -0.948 0.907  0.906 0.092
50-10 difference 
0.769  -0.001 -0.037 -0.360 0.210  0.789 -0.020
Wholesale Trade 
10th percentile 
8.960  -0.009 0.094 0.578 -0.502  8.869 0.091
50th percentile 
9.864  -0.011 0.156 0.117 -0.090  9.774 0.090
90th percentile 
10.829  -0.016 0.126 -0.144 0.122  10.736 0.093
90-10 difference 
1.869  -0.007 0.032 -0.722 0.624  1.867 0.002
90-50 difference 
0.965  -0.005 -0.030 -0.261 0.212  0.962 0.003
50-10 difference 
0.904  -0.002 0.062 -0.461 0.412  0.905 -0.001
Retail 
10th percentile 
9.715  -0.009 0.183 0.908 -0.780  9.538 0.177
50th percentile 
10.497  -0.010 0.183 0.127 -0.098  10.272 0.225
90th percentile 
11.621  -0.007 0.105 -0.174 0.232  11.260 0.361
90-10 difference 
1.906  0.002 -0.078 -1.082 1.012  1.722 0.184
90-50 difference 
1.124  0.003 -0.078 -0.301 0.330  0.988 0.136
50-10 difference 
0.782  -0.001 0.000 -0.781 0.682  0.734 0.048
FIRE 
10th percentile 
9.340  -0.026 0.143 0.252 -0.194  9.222 0.118
50th percentile 
10.303  -0.027 0.127 0.059 -0.035  10.197 0.106
90th percentile 
11.240  -0.022 0.062 -0.163 0.183  11.087 0.153
90-10 difference 
1.900  0.004 -0.081 -0.415 0.377  1.865 0.035
90-50 difference 
0.937  0.005 -0.065 -0.222 0.218  0.890 0.047
50-10 difference 
0.963  -0.001 -0.016 -0.193 0.159  0.975 -0.012
Services 
10th percentile 
9.832  -0.070 0.094 0.129 -0.183  9.816 0.016
50th percentile 
10.464  -0.083 0.069 0.013 -0.055  10.452 0.012
90th percentile 
11.066  -0.063 0.064 0.004 -0.002  10.969 0.097
90-10 difference 
1.234  0.007 -0.030 -0.125 0.181  1.153 0.081
90-50 difference 
0.602  0.020 -0.005 -0.009 0.053  0.517 0.085
50-10 difference 
0.632  -0.013 -0.025 -0.116 0.128  0.636 -0.004
Source: LEHD data for IL, MD and NC. 
Notes: Entries in columns (2) - (5) report the change in the measure when the factor is either assumed not to have occurred as in worker and firm 
entry and exit or replaced by its value in 1992 as in observed worker characteristics and the conditional distribution of worker matches (q) given a 
firm level of pay (y). 
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Log Earnings
1992 2003
Source: Longitudinal Employer and Household Dynamics data for CA, IL, MD, and NC.
All Sectors
Figure 1: 1992 and 2003 Log Earnings Real Cumulative Distribution Functions   
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Source: LEHD data for CA, IL, MD & 
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Source: Longitudinal Employer and Household Dynamics data for CA, IL, MD, and NC.
Panel A
Figure 5: Quarterly Firm Entry and Exit Rates by Sector
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Source: Longitudinal Employer and Household Dynamics data for CA, IL, MD, and NC.
Panel B









Source: Longitudinal Employer and Household Dynamics data for CA, IL, MD & NC.
Figure 6: Joint Distribution of Worker Human Capital (theta) and Firm Pay Policy (psi) Match
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Source: LEHD data for CA, IL, MD & NC. Notes: Both θ  and ψ measured as deviations from year 
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Log Real Earnings
Source: Longitudinal Employer and Household Dynamics data for CA, IL, MD, and NC.
All Sectors
Figure 8: 2003 - 1992 Difference in Log Real Earnings Cumulative Distribution Functions
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6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Log Real Earnings
03_iexe92-92 diff 03_iexep92-92 diff
Difference Due to Changes in Sorting of Workers and Firms
Source: Longitudinal Employer and Household Dynamics data for CA, IL, MD, and NC.
Notes: The notation 03_i92, 03_ie92, 03_iex92, 03_iexe92, and 03_iexep92-92 refers to the 2003 distribution with the industry employment distribution,industry employment distribution - set of workers,
industry employment distribution - set of workers - observable characteristics, industry employment distribution - set of workers - observable characteristics - set of firms, and industry employment
distribution- set of workers - observable characteristics - set of firms - conditional distribution of theta given psi, respectively, the same as in 1992.
All Sectors
Figure 9: Decomposition of Differences in Log Real Earnings Cumulative Distribution Functions   
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Difference Due to Changes in Sorting of Workers and Firms
Source: Longitudinal Employer and Household Dynamics data for CA, IL, MD, and NC.
Notes: The notation 03_e92, 03_ex92, 03_exe92, and 03_ixep92-92 refers to the, set of workers, set of workers - observable characteristics, set of workers - observable characteristics - set of firms, and
set of workers - observable characteristics - set of firms - conditional distribution of theta given psi, respectively, the same as in 1992.
AgricFishForest Sector
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Difference Due to Changes in Sorting of Workers and Firms
Source: Longitudinal Employer and Household Dynamics data for CA, IL, MD, and NC.
Notes: The notation 03_e92, 03_ex92, 03_exe92, and 03_ixep92-92 refers to the, set of workers, set of workers - observable characteristics, set of workers - observable characteristics - set of firms, and
set of workers - observable characteristics - set of firms - conditional distribution of theta given psi, respectively, the same as in 1992.
Mining Sector
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Difference Due to Changes in Sorting of Workers and Firms
Source: Longitudinal Employer and Household Dynamics data for CA, IL, MD, and NC.
Notes: The notation 03_e92, 03_ex92, 03_exe92, and 03_ixep92-92 refers to the, set of workers, set of workers - observable characteristics, set of workers - observable characteristics - set of firms, and
set of workers - observable characteristics - set of firms - conditional distribution of theta given psi, respectively, the same as in 1992.
Construction Sector
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Difference Due to Changes in Sorting of Workers and Firms
Source: Longitudinal Employer and Household Dynamics data for CA, IL, MD, and NC.
Notes: The notation 03_e92, 03_ex92, 03_exe92, and 03_ixep92-92 refers to the, set of workers, set of workers - observable characteristics, set of workers - observable characteristics - set of firms, and
set of workers - observable characteristics - set of firms - conditional distribution of theta given psi, respectively, the same as in 1992.
Manufacturing Sector
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03_exe92-92 diff 03_exep92-92 diff
Difference Due to Changes in Sorting of Workers and Firms
Source: Longitudinal Employer and Household Dynamics data for CA, IL, MD, and NC.
Notes: The notation 03_e92, 03_ex92, 03_exe92, and 03_ixep92-92 refers to the, set of workers, set of workers - observable characteristics, set of workers - observable characteristics - set of firms, and
set of workers - observable characteristics - set of firms - conditional distribution of theta given psi, respectively, the same as in 1992.
TransCommunication Sector
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Difference Due to Changes in Sorting of Workers and Firms
Source: Longitudinal Employer and Household Dynamics data for CA, IL, MD, and NC.
Notes: The notation 03_e92, 03_ex92, 03_exe92, and 03_ixep92-92 refers to the, set of workers, set of workers - observable characteristics, set of workers - observable characteristics - set of firms, and
set of workers - observable characteristics - set of firms - conditional distribution of theta given psi, respectively, the same as in 1992.
Wholesale Trade Sector
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Difference Due to Changes in Sorting of Workers and Firms
Source: Longitudinal Employer and Household Dynamics data for CA, IL, MD, and NC.
Notes: The notation 03_e92, 03_ex92, 03_exe92, and 03_ixep92-92 refers to the, set of workers, set of workers - observable characteristics, set of workers - observable characteristics - set of firms, and
set of workers - observable characteristics - set of firms - conditional distribution of theta given psi, respectively, the same as in 1992.
Retail Trade Sector
Decomposition of Differences in Log Real Earnings Cumulative Distribution Functions   
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03_exe92-92 diff 03_exep92-92 diff
Difference Due to Changes in Sorting of Workers and Firms
Source: Longitudinal Employer and Household Dynamics data for CA, IL, MD, and NC.
Notes: The notation 03_e92, 03_ex92, 03_exe92, and 03_ixep92-92 refers to the, set of workers, set of workers - observable characteristics, set of workers - observable characteristics - set of firms, and
set of workers - observable characteristics - set of firms - conditional distribution of theta given psi, respectively, the same as in 1992.
FIRE Sector
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Difference Due to Changes in Sorting of Workers and Firms
Source: Longitudinal Employer and Household Dynamics data for CA, IL, MD, and NC.
Notes: The notation 03_e92, 03_ex92, 03_exe92, and 03_ixep92-92 refers to the, set of workers, set of workers - observable characteristics, set of workers - observable characteristics - set of firms, and
set of workers - observable characteristics - set of firms - conditional distribution of theta given psi, respectively, the same as in 1992.
Services Sector
Decomposition of Differences in Log Real Earnings Cumulative Distribution Functions
 